This article was published on Global Research April 29, 2013.
Global Research Editor’s Note
The following document pertaining to the formation of “Greater Israel” constitutes the cornerstone of powerful Zionist factions within the current Netanyahu government, the Likud party, as well as within the Israeli military and intelligence establishment.
According to the founding father of Zionism Theodore Herzl, “the area of the Jewish State stretches: “From the Brook of Egypt to the Euphrates.” According to Rabbi Fischmann, “The Promised Land extends from the River of Egypt up to the Euphrates, it includes parts of Syria and Lebanon.”
When
viewed in the current context, the war on Iraq, the 2006 war on
Lebanon, the 2011 war on Libya, the ongoing war on Syria, not to mention
the process of regime change in Egypt, must be understood in relation
to the Zionist Plan for the Middle East. The latter consists in
weakening and eventually fracturing neighboring Arab states as part of
an Israeli expansionist project. “Greater Israel” consists in an area extending from the Nile Valley to the Euphrates.
The Zionist project supports the Jewish settlement movement. More broadly it involves a policy of excluding Palestinians from Palestine leading to the eventual annexation of both the West Bank and Gaza to the State of Israel.
Greater Israel would create a number of proxy States. It would include parts of Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, the Sinai, as well as parts of Iraq and Saudi Arabia. (See map).
According to Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya in a 2011 Global Research article, The Yinon Plan was a continuation of Britain’s colonial design in the Middle East:
“[The Yinon
plan] is an Israeli strategic plan to ensure Israeli regional
superiority. It insists and stipulates that Israel must reconfigure its
geo-political environment through the balkanization of the surrounding
Arab states into smaller and weaker states.
Israeli
strategists viewed Iraq as their biggest strategic challenge from an
Arab state. This is why Iraq was outlined as the centerpiece to the
balkanization of the Middle East and the Arab World. In Iraq, on the
basis of the concepts of the Yinon Plan, Israeli strategists have called
for the division of Iraq into a Kurdish state and two Arab states, one
for Shiite Muslims and the other for Sunni Muslims. The first step
towards establishing this was a war between Iraq and Iran, which the
Yinon Plan discusses.
The Atlantic, in 2008, and the U.S.
military’s Armed Forces Journal, in 2006, both published widely
circulated maps that closely followed the outline of the Yinon Plan.
Aside from a divided Iraq, which the Biden Plan also calls for, the
Yinon Plan calls for a divided Lebanon, Egypt, and Syria. The
partitioning of Iran, Turkey, Somalia, and Pakistan also all fall into
line with these views. The Yinon Plan also calls for dissolution in
North Africa and forecasts it as starting from Egypt and then spilling
over into Sudan, Libya, and the rest of the region.
Greater Israel” requires the breaking up of the existing Arab states into small states.
“The plan operates on two essential premises. To survive, Israel must 1) become an imperial regional power,
and 2) must effect the division of the whole area into small states by
the dissolution of all existing Arab states. Small here will depend on
the ethnic or sectarian composition of each state. Consequently, the
Zionist hope is that sectarian-based states become Israel’s satellites
and, ironically, its source of moral legitimation… This is not a new
idea, nor does it surface for the first time in Zionist strategic
thinking. Indeed, fragmenting all Arab states into smaller units has
been a recurrent theme.” (Yinon Plan, see below)
Viewed in this context, the war on Syria is part of the process
of Israeli territorial expansion. Israeli intelligence working hand in
glove with the US, Turkey and NATO is directly supportive of the Al
Qaeda terrorist mercenaries inside Syria. The Zionist Project also requires the destabilization of Egypt, the creation of factional divisions within Egypt as instrumented by the “Arab Spring” leading to the formation of a sectarian based State dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood.
Michel Chossudovsky, Global Research, April 29, 2013
The Zionist Plan for the Middle East
Translated and edited by
Israel Shahak
The Israel of Theodore Herzl (1904) and of Rabbi Fischmann (1947)
In his Complete Diaries, Vol. II. p. 711, Theodore Herzl, the
founder of Zionism, says that the area of the Jewish State stretches:
“From the Brook of Egypt to the Euphrates.”Rabbi Fischmann, member of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, declared in his testimony to the U.N. Special Committee of Enquiry on 9 July 1947: “The Promised Land extends from the River of Egypt up to the Euphrates, it includes parts of Syria and Lebanon.”
from
Oded Yinon’s
“A Strategy for Israel in the Nineteen Eighties”
Published by the
Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc.
Belmont, Massachusetts, 1982
Special Document No. 1 (ISBN 0-937694-56-8)
Table of Contents
The Association of Arab-American University Graduates finds it
compelling to inaugurate its new publication series, Special Documents,
with Oded Yinon’s article which appeared in Kivunim (Directions), the
journal of the Department of Information of the World Zionist
Organization. Oded Yinon is an Israeli journalist and was formerly
attached to the Foreign Ministry of Israel. To our knowledge, this
document is the most explicit, detailed and unambiguous statement to
date of the Zionist strategy in the Middle East. Furthermore, it stands
as an accurate representation of the “vision” for the entire Middle East
of the presently ruling Zionist regime of Begin, Sharon and Eitan. Its
importance, hence, lies not in its historical value but in the nightmare
which it presents.
2
The plan operates on two essential premises. To survive, Israel
must 1) become an imperial regional power, and 2) must effect the
division of the whole area into small states by the dissolution of all
existing Arab states. Small here will depend on the ethnic or sectarian
composition of each state. Consequently, the Zionist hope is that
sectarian-based states become Israel’s satellites and, ironically, its
source of moral legitimation.
3
This is not a new idea, nor does it surface for the first time in
Zionist strategic thinking. Indeed, fragmenting all Arab states into
smaller units has been a recurrent theme. This theme has been documented
on a very modest scale in the AAUG publication, Israel’s Sacred Terrorism
(1980), by Livia Rokach. Based on the memoirs of Moshe Sharett, former
Prime Minister of Israel, Rokach’s study documents, in convincing
detail, the Zionist plan as it applies to Lebanon and as it was prepared
in the mid-fifties.
4
The first massive Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978 bore this
plan out to the minutest detail. The second and more barbaric and
encompassing Israeli invasion of Lebanon on June 6, 1982, aims to effect
certain parts of this plan which hopes to see not only Lebanon, but
Syria and Jordan as well, in fragments. This ought to make mockery of
Israeli public claims regarding their desire for a strong and
independent Lebanese central government. More accurately, they want a
Lebanese central government that sanctions their regional imperialist
designs by signing a peace treaty with them. They also seek acquiescence
in their designs by the Syrian, Iraqi, Jordanian and other Arab
governments as well as by the Palestinian people. What they want and
what they are planning for is not an Arab world, but a world of Arab
fragments that is ready to succumb to Israeli hegemony. Hence, Oded
Yinon in his essay, “A Strategy for Israel in the 1980′s,” talks about
“far-reaching opportunities for the first time since 1967″ that are
created by the “very stormy situation [that] surrounds Israel.”
5
The Zionist policy of displacing the Palestinians from Palestine
is very much an active policy, but is pursued more forcefully in times
of conflict, such as in the 1947-1948 war and in the 1967 war. An
appendix entitled ”Israel Talks of a New Exodus”
is included in this publication to demonstrate past Zionist dispersals
of Palestinians from their homeland and to show, besides the main
Zionist document we present, other Zionist planning for the
de-Palestinization of Palestine.
6
It is clear from the Kivunim document, published in February,
1982, that the “far-reaching opportunities” of which Zionist strategists
have been thinking are the same “opportunities” of which they are
trying to convince the world and which they claim were generated by
their June, 1982 invasion. It is also clear that the Palestinians were
never the sole target of Zionist plans, but the priority target since
their viable and independent presence as a people negates the essence of
the Zionist state. Every Arab state, however, especially those with
cohesive and clear nationalist directions, is a real target sooner or
later.
7
Contrasted with the detailed and unambiguous Zionist strategy
elucidated in this document, Arab and Palestinian strategy,
unfortunately, suffers from ambiguity and incoherence. There is no
indication that Arab strategists have internalized the Zionist plan in
its full ramifications. Instead, they react with incredulity and shock
whenever a new stage of it unfolds. This is apparent in Arab reaction,
albeit muted, to the Israeli siege of Beirut. The sad fact is that as
long as the Zionist strategy for the Middle East is not taken seriously
Arab reaction to any future siege of other Arab capitals will be the
same.
Khalil Nakhleh
Khalil Nakhleh
July 23, 1982
Foreward
by Israel Shahak
1
The following essay represents, in my opinion, the accurate and
detailed plan of the present Zionist regime (of Sharon and Eitan) for
the Middle East which is based on the division of the whole area into small states, and the dissolution of all the existing Arab states. I will comment on the military aspect of this plan in a concluding note. Here I want to draw the attention of the readers to several important points:
2
1. The idea that all the Arab states should be broken down,
by Israel, into small units, occurs again and again in Israeli strategic
thinking. For example, Ze’ev Schiff, the military correspondent of Ha’aretz
(and probably the most knowledgeable in Israel, on this topic) writes
about the “best” that can happen for Israeli interests in Iraq: “The
dissolution of Iraq into a Shi’ite state, a Sunni state and the
separation of the Kurdish part” (Ha’aretz 6/2/1982). Actually, this aspect of the plan is very old.
3
2. The strong connection with Neo-Conservative thought in the USA is very prominent, especially in the author’s notes. But,
while lip service is paid to the idea of the “defense of the West” from
Soviet power, the real aim of the author, and of the present Israeli
establishment is clear: To make an Imperial Israel into a world power.
In other words, the aim of Sharon is to deceive the Americans after he
has deceived all the rest.
4
3. It is obvious that much of the relevant data, both in the notes and in the text, is garbled or omitted, such as the financial help of the U.S. to Israel. Much of it is pure fantasy. But, the plan is not to be regarded as not influential, or as not capable of realization for a short time. The plan follows faithfully the geopolitical ideas current in Germany of 1890-1933, which were swallowed whole by Hitler and the Nazi movement, and determined their aims for East Europe.
Those aims, especially the division of the existing states, were
carried out in 1939-1941, and only an alliance on the global scale
prevented their consolidation for a period of time.
5
The notes by the author follow the text. To avoid confusion, I did
not add any notes of my own, but have put the substance of them into
this foreward and the conclusion at the end. I have, however, emphasized
some portions of the text.Israel Shahak
June 13, 1982
A Strategy for Israel in the Nineteen Eighties
by Oded Yinon
This essay originally appeared in Hebrew in KIVUNIM (Directions),
A Journal for Judaism and Zionism; Issue No, 14–Winter, 5742, February
1982, Editor: Yoram Beck. Editorial Committee: Eli Eyal, Yoram Beck,
Amnon Hadari, Yohanan Manor, Elieser Schweid. Published by the Department of Publicity/The World Zionist Organization, Jerusalem.
1
At the outset of the nineteen eighties the State of Israel is in need
of a new perspective as to its place, its aims and national targets, at
home and abroad. This need has become even more vital due to a number
of central processes which the country, the region and the world are
undergoing. We are living today in the early stages of a new epoch in
human history which is not at all similar to its predecessor, and its
characteristics are totally different from what we have hitherto known.
That is why we need an understanding of the central processes which
typify this historical epoch on the one hand, and on the other hand we
need a world outlook and an operational strategy in accordance with the
new conditions. The existence, prosperity and steadfastness of the
Jewish state will depend upon its ability to adopt a new framework for
its domestic and foreign affairs.
2
This epoch is characterized by several traits which we can already
diagnose, and which symbolize a genuine revolution in our present
lifestyle. The dominant process is the breakdown of the rationalist,
humanist outlook as the major cornerstone supporting the life and
achievements of Western civilization since the Renaissance. The
political, social and economic views which have emanated from this
foundation have been based on several “truths” which are presently
disappearing–for example, the view that man as an individual is the
center of the universe and everything exists in order to fulfill his
basic material needs. This position is being invalidated in the present
when it has become clear that the amount of resources in the cosmos does
not meet Man’s requirements, his economic needs or his demographic
constraints. In a world in which there are four billion human beings and
economic and energy resources which do not grow proportionally to meet
the needs of mankind, it is unrealistic to expect to fulfill the main
requirement of Western Society, 1
i.e., the wish and aspiration for boundless consumption. The view that
ethics plays no part in determining the direction Man takes, but rather
his material needs do–that view is becoming prevalent today as we see a
world in which nearly all values are disappearing. We are losing the
ability to assess the simplest things, especially when they concern the
simple question of what is Good and what is Evil.
3
The vision of man’s limitless aspirations and abilities shrinks in
the face of the sad facts of life, when we witness the break-up of world
order around us. The view which promises liberty and freedom to mankind
seems absurd in light of the sad fact that three fourths of the human
race lives under totalitarian regimes. The views concerning equality and
social justice have been transformed by socialism and especially by
Communism into a laughing stock. There is no argument as to the truth of
these two ideas, but it is clear that they have not been put into
practice properly and the majority of mankind has lost the liberty, the
freedom and the opportunity for equality and justice. In this nuclear
world in which we are (still) living in relative peace for thirty years,
the concept of peace and coexistence among nations has no meaning when a
superpower like the USSR holds a military and political doctrine of the
sort it has: that not only is a nuclear war possible and necessary in
order to achieve the ends of Marxism, but that it is possible to survive
after it, not to speak of the fact that one can be victorious in it.2
4
The essential concepts of human society, especially those of the
West, are undergoing a change due to political, military and economic
transformations. Thus, the nuclear and conventional might of the USSR
has transformed the epoch that has just ended into the last respite
before the great saga that will demolish a large part of our world in a
multi-dimensional global war, in comparison with which the past world
wars will have been mere child’s play. The power of nuclear as well as
of conventional weapons, their quantity, their precision and quality
will turn most of our world upside down within a few years, and we must
align ourselves so as to face that in Israel. That is, then, the main
threat to our existence and that of the Western world. 3
The war over resources in the world, the Arab monopoly on oil, and the
need of the West to import most of its raw materials from the Third
World, are transforming the world we know, given that one of the major
aims of the USSR is to defeat the West by gaining control over the
gigantic resources in the Persian Gulf and in the southern part of
Africa, in which the majority of world minerals are located. We can
imagine the dimensions of the global confrontation which will face us in
the future.
5
The Gorshkov doctrine calls for Soviet control of the oceans and
mineral rich areas of the Third World. That together with the present
Soviet nuclear doctrine which holds that it is possible to manage, win
and survive a nuclear war, in the course of which the West’s military
might well be destroyed and its inhabitants made slaves in the service
of Marxism-Leninism, is the main danger to world peace and to our own
existence. Since 1967, the Soviets have transformed Clausewitz’ dictum
into “War is the continuation of policy in nuclear means,” and made it
the motto which guides all their policies. Already today they are busy
carrying out their aims in our region and throughout the world, and the
need to face them becomes the major element in our country’s security
policy and of course that of the rest of the Free World. That is our
major foreign challenge.4
6
The Arab Moslem world, therefore, is not the major strategic problem
which we shall face in the Eighties, despite the fact that it carries
the main threat against Israel, due to its growing military might. This
world, with its ethnic minorities, its factions and internal crises,
which is astonishingly self-destructive, as we can see in Lebanon, in
non-Arab Iran and now also in Syria, is unable to deal successfully with
its fundamental problems and does not therefore constitute a real
threat against the State of Israel in the long run, but only in the
short run where its immediate military power has great import. In the
long run, this world will be unable to exist within its present
framework in the areas around us without having to go through genuine
revolutionary changes. The Moslem Arab World is built like a temporary
house of cards put together by foreigners (France and Britain in the
Nineteen Twenties), without the wishes and desires of the inhabitants
having been taken into account. It was arbitrarily divided into 19
states, all made of combinations of minorites and ethnic groups which
are hostile to one another, so that every Arab Moslem state nowadays
faces ethnic social destruction from within, and in some a civil war is
already raging. 5 Most of the Arabs, 118 million out of 170 million, live in Africa, mostly in Egypt (45 million today).
7
Apart from Egypt, all the Maghreb states are made up of a mixture of
Arabs and non-Arab Berbers. In Algeria there is already a civil war
raging in the Kabile mountains between the two nations in the country.
Morocco and Algeria are at war with each other over Spanish Sahara, in
addition to the internal struggle in each of them. Militant Islam
endangers the integrity of Tunisia and Qaddafi organizes wars which are
destructive from the Arab point of view, from a country which is
sparsely populated and which cannot become a powerful nation. That is
why he has been attempting unifications in the past with states that are
more genuine, like Egypt and Syria. Sudan, the most torn apart state in
the Arab Moslem world today is built upon four groups hostile to each
other, an Arab Moslem Sunni minority which rules over a majority of
non-Arab Africans, Pagans, and Christians. In Egypt there is a Sunni
Moslem majority facing a large minority of Christians which is dominant
in upper Egypt: some 7 million of them, so that even Sadat, in his
speech on May 8, expressed the fear that they will want a state of their
own, something like a “second” Christian Lebanon in Egypt.
8
All the Arab States east of Israel are torn apart, broken up and
riddled with inner conflict even more than those of the Maghreb. Syria
is fundamentally no different from Lebanon except in the strong military
regime which rules it. But the real civil war taking place nowadays
between the Sunni majority and the Shi’ite Alawi ruling minority (a mere
12% of the population) testifies to the severity of the domestic
trouble.
9
Iraq is, once again, no different in essence from its neighbors,
although its majority is Shi’ite and the ruling minority Sunni.
Sixty-five percent of the population has no say in politics, in which an
elite of 20 percent holds the power. In addition there is a large
Kurdish minority in the north, and if it weren’t for the strength of the
ruling regime, the army and the oil revenues, Iraq’s future state would
be no different than that of Lebanon in the past or of Syria today. The
seeds of inner conflict and civil war are apparent today already,
especially after the rise of Khomeini to power in Iran, a leader whom
the Shi’ites in Iraq view as their natural leader.
10
All the Gulf principalities and Saudi Arabia are built upon a
delicate house of sand in which there is only oil. In Kuwait, the
Kuwaitis constitute only a quarter of the population. In Bahrain, the
Shi’ites are the majority but are deprived of power. In the UAE,
Shi’ites are once again the majority but the Sunnis are in power. The
same is true of Oman and North Yemen. Even in the Marxist South Yemen
there is a sizable Shi’ite minority. In Saudi Arabia half the population
is foreign, Egyptian and Yemenite, but a Saudi minority holds power.
11
Jordan is in reality Palestinian, ruled by a Trans-Jordanian Bedouin
minority, but most of the army and certainly the bureaucracy is now
Palestinian. As a matter of fact Amman is as Palestinian as Nablus. All
of these countries have powerful armies, relatively speaking. But there
is a problem there too. The Syrian army today is mostly Sunni with an
Alawi officer corps, the Iraqi army Shi’ite with Sunni commanders. This
has great significance in the long run, and that is why it will not be
possible to retain the loyalty of the army for a long time except where
it comes to the only common denominator: The hostility towards Israel,
and today even that is insufficient.
12
Alongside the Arabs, split as they are, the other Moslem states share
a similar predicament. Half of Iran’s population is comprised of a
Persian speaking group and the other half of an ethnically Turkish
group. Turkey’s population comprises a Turkish Sunni Moslem majority,
some 50%, and two large minorities, 12 million Shi’ite Alawis and 6
million Sunni Kurds. In Afghanistan there are 5 million
Shi’ites who constitute one third of the population. In Sunni
Pakistan there are 15 million Shi’ites who endanger the existence of
that state.
13
This national ethnic minority picture extending from Morocco to India
and from Somalia to Turkey points to the absence of stability and a
rapid degeneration in the entire region. When this picture is added to
the economic one, we see how the entire region is built like a house of
cards, unable to withstand its severe problems.
14
In this giant and fractured world there are a few wealthy groups and a
huge mass of poor people. Most of the Arabs have an average yearly
income of 300 dollars. That is the situation in Egypt, in most of the
Maghreb countries except for Libya, and in Iraq. Lebanon is torn apart
and its economy is falling to pieces. It is a state in which there is no
centralized power, but only 5 de facto sovereign authorities (Christian
in the north, supported by the Syrians and under the rule of the
Franjieh clan, in the East an area of direct Syrian conquest, in the
center a Phalangist controlled Christian enclave, in the south and up to
the Litani river a mostly Palestinian region controlled by the PLO and
Major Haddad’s state of Christians and half a million Shi’ites). Syria
is in an even graver situation and even the assistance she will obtain
in the future after the unification with Libya will not be sufficient
for dealing with the basic problems of existence and the maintenance of a
large army. Egypt is in the worst situation: Millions are on the verge
of hunger, half the labor force is unemployed, and housing is scarce in
this most densely populated area of the world. Except for the army,
there is not a single department operating efficiently and the state is
in a permanent state of bankruptcy and depends entirely on American
foreign assistance granted since the peace.6
15
In the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Egypt there is the
largest accumulation of money and oil in the world, but those enjoying
it are tiny elites who lack a wide base of support and self-confidence,
something that no army can guarantee. 7
The Saudi army with all its equipment cannot defend the regime from
real dangers at home or abroad, and what took place in Mecca in 1980 is
only an example. A sad and very stormy situation surrounds Israel and
creates challenges for it, problems, risks but also far-reaching opportunities for the first time since 1967. Chances are that opportunities missed at that time will become achievable in the Eighties to an extent and along dimensions which we cannot even imagine today.
16
The “peace” policy and the return of territories, through a
dependence upon the US, precludes the realization of the new option
created for us. Since 1967, all the governments of Israel have tied our
national aims down to narrow political needs, on the one hand, and on
the other to destructive opinions at home which neutralized our
capacities both at home and abroad. Failing to take steps towards the
Arab population in the new territories, acquired in the course of a war
forced upon us, is the major strategic error committed by Israel on the
morning after the Six Day War. We could have saved ourselves all the
bitter and dangerous conflict since then if we had given Jordan to the
Palestinians who live west of the Jordan river. By doing that we would
have neutralized the Palestinian problem which we nowadays face, and to
which we have found solutions that are really no solutions at all, such
as territorial compromise or autonomy which amount, in fact, to the same
thing. 8
Today, we suddenly face immense opportunities for transforming the
situation thoroughly and this we must do in the coming decade, otherwise
we shall not survive as a state.
17
In the course of the Nineteen Eighties, the State of Israel will have
to go through far-reaching changes in its political and economic regime
domestically, along with radical changes in its foreign policy, in
order to stand up to the global and regional challenges of this new
epoch. The loss of the Suez Canal oil fields, of the immense potential
of the oil, gas and other natural resources in the Sinai peninsula which
is geomorphologically identical to the rich oil-producing countries in
the region, will result in an energy drain in the near future and will
destroy our domestic economy: one quarter of our present GNP as well as
one third of the budget is used for the purchase of oil. 9 The search for raw materials in the Negev and on the coast will not, in the near future, serve to alter that state of affairs.
18
(Regaining) the Sinai peninsula with its present and potential resources is therefore a political priority which is obstructed by the Camp David and the peace agreements. The fault for that lies of course with the
present Israeli government and the governments which paved the road to
the policy of territorial compromise, the Alignment governments since
1967. The Egyptians will not need to keep the peace treaty after the
return of the Sinai, and they will do all they can to return to the fold
of the Arab world and to the USSR in order to gain support and military
assistance. American aid is guaranteed only for a short while, for the
terms of the peace and the weakening of the U.S. both at home and abroad
will bring about a reduction in aid. Without oil and the income from
it, with the present enormous expenditure, we will not be able to get
through 1982 under the present conditions and we will have to act in order to return
the situation to the status quo which existed in Sinai prior to Sadat’s
visit and the mistaken peace agreement signed with him in March 1979. 10
19
Israel has two major routes through which to realize this purpose,
one direct and the other indirect. The direct option is the less
realistic one because of the nature of the regime and government in
Israel as well as the wisdom of Sadat who obtained our withdrawal from
Sinai, which was, next to the war of 1973, his major achievement since
he took power. Israel will not unilaterally break the treaty, neither
today, nor in 1982, unless it is very hard pressed economically and
politically and Egypt provides Israel with the excuse to take the Sinai back into our hands for the fourth time in our short history. What is left therefore, is the indirect option. The economic situation in Egypt, the nature of the regime and its pan-
Arab policy, will bring about a situation after April 1982 in which Israel will be forced to act directly or indirectly in order to regain control over Sinai as a strategic, economic and energy reserve for the long run. Egypt does not constitute a military strategic problem due to its internal conflicts and it could be driven back to the post 1967 war situation in no more than one day. 11
20
The myth of Egypt as the strong leader of the Arab World was
demolished back in 1956 and definitely did not survive 1967, but our
policy, as in the return of the Sinai, served to turn the myth into
“fact.” In reality, however, Egypt’s power in proportion both to Israel
alone and to the rest of the Arab World has gone down about 50 percent
since 1967. Egypt is no longer the leading political power in the Arab
World and is economically on the verge of a crisis. Without foreign
assistance the crisis will come tomorrow. 12
In the short run, due to the return of the Sinai, Egypt will gain
several advantages at our expense, but only in the short run until 1982,
and that will not change the balance of power to its benefit, and will
possibly bring about its downfall. Egypt, in its present domestic
political picture, is already a corpse, all the more so if we take into
account the growing Moslem-Christian rift. Breaking Egypt
down territorially into distinct geographical regions is the political
aim of Israel in the Nineteen Eighties on its Western front.
21
Egypt is divided and torn apart into many foci of authority. If Egypt
falls apart, countries like Libya, Sudan or even the more distant
states will not continue to exist in their present form and will join the downfall
and dissolution of Egypt. The vision of a Christian Coptic State in
Upper Egypt alongside a number of weak states with very localized power
and without a centralized government as to date, is the key to a
historical development which was only set back by the peace agreement
but which seems inevitable in the long run. 13
22
The Western front, which on the surface appears more problematic, is
in fact less complicated than the Eastern front, in which most of the
events that make the headlines have been taking place recently.
Lebanon’s total dissolution into five provinces serves as a precendent for the entire Arab world including
Egypt, Syria, Iraq and the Arabian peninsula and is already following
that track. The dissolution of Syria and Iraq later on into ethnically
or religiously unqiue areas such as in Lebanon, is Israel’s primary
target on the Eastern front in the long run, while the dissolution of
the military power of those states serves as the primary short term
target. Syria will fall apart, in accordance with its ethnic and
religious structure, into several states such as in present day Lebanon,
so that there will be a Shi’ite Alawi state along its coast, a Sunni
state in the Aleppo area, another Sunni state in Damascus hostile to its
northern neighbor, and the Druzes who will set up a state, maybe even in our Golan, and certainly in the Hauran and in northern Jordan. This state of affairs will be the guarantee for peace and security in the area in the long run, and that aim is already within our reach today. 14
23
Iraq, rich in oil on the one hand and internally torn on the other, is guaranteed as a candidate for Israel’s targets. Its dissolution is even more important for us than that of Syria. Iraq is stronger than Syria.
In the short run it is Iraqi power which constitutes the greatest
threat to Israel. An Iraqi-Iranian war will tear Iraq apart and cause
its downfall at home even before it is able to organize a struggle on a
wide front against us. Every kind of inter-Arab confrontation will assist us in the short run and will shorten the way to the more important aim of breaking up Iraq into denominations as in Syria and in Lebanon. In Iraq, a division into provinces along ethnic/religious lines as in Syria during Ottoman times is
possible. So, three (or more) states will exist around the three major
cities: Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, and Shi’ite areas in the south will
separate from the Sunni and Kurdish north. It is possible that the
present Iranian-Iraqi confrontation will deepen this polarization. 15
24
The entire Arabian peninsula is a natural candidate for dissolution
due to internal and external pressures, and the matter is inevitable
especially in Saudi Arabia. Regardless of whether its economic might
based on oil remains intact or whether it is diminished in the long run,
the internal rifts and breakdowns are a clear and natural development
in light of the present political structure. 16
25
Jordan constitutes an immediate strategic target in the short run but not in the long run, for it does not constitute a real threat in the long run after its dissolution, the termination of the lengthy rule of King Hussein and the transfer of power to the Palestinians in the short run.
26
There is no chance that Jordan will continue to exist in its present
structure for a long time, and Israel’s policy, both in war and in
peace, ought to be directed at the liquidation of Jordan under the
present regime and the transfer of power to the Palestinian majority.
Changing the regime east of the river will also cause the termination of the problem of the territories densely populated with Arabs west of the Jordan.
Whether in war or under conditions of peace, emigration from the
territories and economic demographic freeze in them, are the guarantees
for the coming change on both banks of the river, and we ought to be
active in order to accelerate this process in the nearest future. The autonomy plan ought also
to be rejected, as well as any compromise or division of the
territories for, given the plans of the PLO and those of the Israeli
Arabs themselves, the Shefa’amr plan of September 1980, it is not
possible to go on living in this country in the present situation
without separating the two nations, the Arabs to Jordan and the Jews to
the areas west of the river. Genuine coexistence and peace will reign over the land
only when the Arabs understand that without Jewish rule between the
Jordan and the sea they will have neither existence nor security. A
nation of their own and security will be theirs only in Jordan. 17
27
Within Israel the distinction between the areas of ’67 and the
territories beyond them, those of ’48, has always been meaningless for
Arabs and nowadays no longer has any significance for us. The problem
should be seen in its entirety without any divisions as of ’67. It
should be clear, under any future political situation or military
constellation, that the solution of the problem of the indigenous Arabs will come only when they recognize the existence of Israel in secure borders up to the Jordan river and beyond it, as our existential need in this difficult epoch, the nuclear epoch which we shall soon enter. It is
no longer possible to live with three fourths of the Jewish population
on the dense shoreline which is so dangerous in a nuclear epoch.
28
Dispersal of the population is therefore a domestic strategic aim of
the highest order; otherwise, we shall cease to exist within any
borders. Judea, Samaria and the Galilee are our sole guarantee for
national existence, and if we do not become the majority in the mountain
areas, we shall not rule in the country and we shall be like the
Crusaders, who lost this country which was not theirs anyhow, and in
which they were foreigners to begin with. Rebalancing the country
demographically, strategically and economically is the highest and most
central aim today. Taking hold of the mountain watershed from Beersheba
to the Upper Galilee is the national aim generated by the major
strategic consideration which is settling the mountainous part of the
country that is empty of Jews today. l8
29
Realizing our aims on the Eastern front depends first on the
realization of this internal strategic objective. The transformation of
the political and economic structure, so as to enable the realization of
these strategic aims, is the key to achieving the entire change. We
need to change from a centralized economy in which the government is
extensively involved, to an open and free market as well as to switch
from depending upon the U.S. taxpayer to developing, with our own hands,
of a genuine productive economic infrastructure. If we are not able to
make this change freely and voluntarily, we shall be forced into it by
world developments, especially in the areas of economics, energy, and
politics, and by our own growing isolation. l9
30
From a military and strategic point of view, the West led by the U.S.
is unable to withstand the global pressures of the USSR throughout the
world, and Israel must therefore stand alone in the Eighties, without
any foreign assistance, military or economic, and this is within our capacities today, with no compromises. 20
Rapid changes in the world will also bring about a change in the
condition of world Jewry to which Israel will become not only a last
resort but the only existential option. We cannot assume that U.S. Jews,
and the communities of Europe and Latin America will continue to exist
in the present form in the future. 21
31
Our existence in this country itself is certain, and there is no
force that could remove us from here either forcefully or by treachery
(Sadat’s method). Despite the difficulties of the mistaken “peace”
policy and the problem of the Israeli Arabs and those of the territories, we can effectively deal with these problems in the foreseeable future.
Conclusion
1
Three important points have to be clarified in order to be able to
understand the significant possibilities of realization of this Zionist
plan for the Middle East, and also why it had to be published.
2
The Military Background of The Plan
The military conditions of this plan have not been mentioned above,
but on the many occasions where something very like it is being
“explained” in closed meetings to members of the Israeli Establishment,
this point is clarified. It is assumed that the Israeli military forces,
in all their branches, are insufficient for the actual work of
occupation of such wide territories as discussed above. In fact, even in
times of intense Palestinian “unrest” on the West Bank, the forces of
the Israeli Army are stretched out too much. The answer to that is the
method of ruling by means of “Haddad forces” or of “Village
Associations” (also known as “Village Leagues”): local forces under
“leaders” completely dissociated from the population, not having even
any feudal or party structure (such as the Phalangists have, for
example). The “states” proposed by Yinon are “Haddadland” and “Village
Associations,” and their armed forces will be, no doubt, quite similar.
In addition, Israeli military superiority in such a situation will be
much greater than it is even now, so that any movement of revolt will be
“punished” either by mass humiliation as in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip, or by bombardment and obliteration of cities, as in Lebanon now
(June 1982), or by both. In order to ensure this, the plan, as
explained orally, calls for the establishment of Israeli garrisons in
focal places between the mini states, equipped with the necessary mobile
destructive forces. In fact, we have seen something like this in
Haddadland and we will almost certainly soon see the first example of
this system functioning either in South Lebanon or in all Lebanon.
3
It is obvious that the above military assumptions, and the whole plan
too, depend also on the Arabs continuing to be even more divided than
they are now, and on the lack of any truly progressive mass movement
among them. It may be that those two conditions will be removed only
when the plan will be well advanced, with consequences which can not be
foreseen.
4
Why it is necessary to publish this in Israel?
The reason for publication is the dual nature of the Israeli-Jewish
society: A very great measure of freedom and democracy, specially for
Jews, combined with expansionism and racist discrimination. In such a
situation the Israeli-Jewish elite (for the masses follow the TV and
Begin’s speeches) has to be persuaded. The first steps in the process of persuasion are oral, as indicated above, but a time comes in which
it becomes inconvenient. Written material must be produced for the
benefit of the more stupid “persuaders” and “explainers” (for example
medium-rank officers, who are, usually, remarkably stupid). They then
“learn it,” more or less, and preach to others. It should be remarked
that Israel, and even the Yishuv from the Twenties, has always
functioned in this way. I myself well remember how (before I was “in
opposition”) the necessity of war with was explained to me and others a
year before the 1956 war, and the necessity of conquering “the rest of
Western Palestine when we will have the opportunity” was explained in
the years 1965-67.
5
Why is it assumed that there is no special risk from the outside in the publication of such plans?
Such risks can come from two sources, so long as the principled
opposition inside Israel is very weak (a situation which may change as a
consequence of the war on Lebanon) : The Arab World, including the
Palestinians, and the United States. The Arab World has shown itself so
far quite incapable of a detailed and rational analysis of
Israeli-Jewish society, and the Palestinians have been, on the average,
no better than the rest. In such a situation, even those who are
shouting about the dangers of Israeli expansionism (which are real
enough) are doing this not because of factual and detailed knowledge,
but because of belief in myth. A good example is the very persistent
belief in the non-existent writing on the wall of the Knesset of the
Biblical verse about the Nile and the Euphrates. Another example is the
persistent, and completely false declarations, which were made by some
of the most important Arab leaders, that the two blue stripes of the
Israeli flag symbolize the Nile and the Euphrates, while in fact they
are taken from the stripes of the Jewish praying shawl (Talit). The
Israeli specialists assume that, on the whole, the Arabs will pay no
attention to their serious discussions of the future, and the Lebanon
war has proved them right. So why should they not continue with their
old methods of persuading other Israelis?
6
In the United States a very similar situation exists, at least until
now. The more or less serious commentators take their information about
Israel, and much of their opinions about it, from two sources. The first
is from articles in the “liberal” American press, written almost
totally by Jewish admirers of Israel who, even if they are critical of
some aspects of the Israeli state, practice loyally what Stalin used to
call “the constructive criticism.” (In fact those among them who claim
also to be “Anti-Stalinist” are in reality more Stalinist than Stalin,
with Israel being their god which has not yet failed). In the framework
of such critical worship it must be assumed that Israel has always “good
intentions” and only “makes mistakes,” and therefore such a plan would
not be a matter for discussion–exactly as the Biblical genocides
committed by Jews are not mentioned. The other source of information, The Jerusalem Post, has similar policies. So long, therefore, as the situation exists in which Israel is really a “closed society” to the rest of the world, because the world wants to close its eyes, the publication and even the beginning of the realization of such a plan is realistic and feasible.
Israel Shahak
June 17, 1982 Jerusalem
About the Translator
Israel Shahak is a professor of organic chemistly at Hebrew University in Jerusalem and the chairman of the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights. He published The Shahak Papers, collections of key articles from the Hebrew press, and is the author of numerous articles and books, among them Non-Jew in the Jewish State. His latest book is Israel’s Global Role: Weapons for Repression, published by the AAUG in 1982. Israel Shahak: (1933-2001)
Notes
1. American Universities Field Staff. Report No.33, 1979. According to this research, the population of the world will be 6 billion in the year 2000. Today’s world population can be broken down as follows: China, 958 million; India, 635 million; USSR, 261 million; U.S., 218 million Indonesia, 140 million; Brazil and Japan, 110 million each. According to the figures of the U.N. Population Fund for 1980, there will be, in 2000, 50 cities with a population of over 5 million each. The population ofthp;Third World will then be 80% of the world population. According to Justin Blackwelder, U.S. Census Office chief, the world population will not reach 6 billion because of hunger.
2. Soviet nuclear policy has been well summarized by two American Sovietologists: Joseph D. Douglas and Amoretta M. Hoeber, Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War, (Stanford, Ca., Hoover Inst. Press, 1979). In the Soviet Union tens and hundreds of articles and books are published each year which detail the Soviet doctrine for nuclear war and there is a great deal of documentation translated into English and published by the U.S. Air Force,including USAF: Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army: The Soviet View, Moscow, 1972; USAF: The Armed Forces of the Soviet State. Moscow, 1975, by Marshal A. Grechko. The basic Soviet approach to the matter is presented in the book by Marshal Sokolovski published in 1962 in Moscow: Marshal V. D. Sokolovski, Military Strategy, Soviet Doctrine and Concepts(New York, Praeger, 1963).
3. A picture of Soviet intentions in various areas of the world can be drawn from the book by Douglas and Hoeber, ibid. For additional material see: Michael Morgan, “USSR’s Minerals as Strategic Weapon in the Future,” Defense and Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C., Dec. 1979.
4. Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov, Sea Power and the State, London, 1979. Morgan, loc. cit. General George S. Brown (USAF) C-JCS, Statement to the Congress on the Defense Posture of the United States For Fiscal Year 1979, p. 103; National Security Council, Review of Non-Fuel Mineral Policy, (Washington, D.C. 1979,); Drew Middleton, The New York Times, (9/15/79); Time, 9/21/80.
June 17, 1982 Jerusalem
About the Translator
Israel Shahak is a professor of organic chemistly at Hebrew University in Jerusalem and the chairman of the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights. He published The Shahak Papers, collections of key articles from the Hebrew press, and is the author of numerous articles and books, among them Non-Jew in the Jewish State. His latest book is Israel’s Global Role: Weapons for Repression, published by the AAUG in 1982. Israel Shahak: (1933-2001)
Notes
1. American Universities Field Staff. Report No.33, 1979. According to this research, the population of the world will be 6 billion in the year 2000. Today’s world population can be broken down as follows: China, 958 million; India, 635 million; USSR, 261 million; U.S., 218 million Indonesia, 140 million; Brazil and Japan, 110 million each. According to the figures of the U.N. Population Fund for 1980, there will be, in 2000, 50 cities with a population of over 5 million each. The population ofthp;Third World will then be 80% of the world population. According to Justin Blackwelder, U.S. Census Office chief, the world population will not reach 6 billion because of hunger.
2. Soviet nuclear policy has been well summarized by two American Sovietologists: Joseph D. Douglas and Amoretta M. Hoeber, Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War, (Stanford, Ca., Hoover Inst. Press, 1979). In the Soviet Union tens and hundreds of articles and books are published each year which detail the Soviet doctrine for nuclear war and there is a great deal of documentation translated into English and published by the U.S. Air Force,including USAF: Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army: The Soviet View, Moscow, 1972; USAF: The Armed Forces of the Soviet State. Moscow, 1975, by Marshal A. Grechko. The basic Soviet approach to the matter is presented in the book by Marshal Sokolovski published in 1962 in Moscow: Marshal V. D. Sokolovski, Military Strategy, Soviet Doctrine and Concepts(New York, Praeger, 1963).
3. A picture of Soviet intentions in various areas of the world can be drawn from the book by Douglas and Hoeber, ibid. For additional material see: Michael Morgan, “USSR’s Minerals as Strategic Weapon in the Future,” Defense and Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C., Dec. 1979.
4. Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov, Sea Power and the State, London, 1979. Morgan, loc. cit. General George S. Brown (USAF) C-JCS, Statement to the Congress on the Defense Posture of the United States For Fiscal Year 1979, p. 103; National Security Council, Review of Non-Fuel Mineral Policy, (Washington, D.C. 1979,); Drew Middleton, The New York Times, (9/15/79); Time, 9/21/80.
5. Elie Kedourie, “The End of the Ottoman Empire,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 3, No.4, 1968.
6. Al-Thawra, Syria 12/20/79, Al-Ahram,12/30/79, Al Ba’ath, Syria, 5/6/79. 55% of the Arabs are 20 years old and younger, 70% of the Arabs live in Africa, 55% of the Arabs under 15 are unemployed, 33% live in urban areas, Oded Yinon, “Egypt’s Population Problem,” The Jerusalem Quarterly, No. 15, Spring 1980.
7. E. Kanovsky, “Arab Haves and Have Nots,” The Jerusalem Quarterly, No.1, Fall 1976, Al Ba’ath, Syria, 5/6/79.
8. In his book, former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin said that the Israeli government is in fact responsible for the design of American policy in the Middle East, after June ’67, because of its own indecisiveness as to the future of the territories and the inconsistency in its positions since it established the background for Resolution 242 and certainly twelve years later for the Camp David agreements and the peace treaty with Egypt. According to Rabin, on June 19, 1967, President Johnson sent a letter to Prime Minister Eshkol in which he did not mention anything about withdrawal from the new territories but exactly on the same day the government resolved to return territories in exchange for peace. After the Arab resolutions in Khartoum (9/1/67) the government altered its position but contrary to its decision of June 19, did not notify the U.S. of the alteration and the U.S. continued to support 242 in the Security Council on the basis of its earlier understanding that Israel is prepared to return territories. At that point it was already too late to change the U.S. position and Israel’s policy. From here the way was opened to peace agreements on the basis of 242 as was later agreed upon in Camp David. See Yitzhak Rabin. Pinkas Sherut, (Ma’ariv 1979) pp. 226-227.
9. Foreign and Defense Committee Chairman Prof. Moshe Arens argued in an interview (Ma ‘ariv,10/3/80) that the Israeli government failed to prepare an economic plan before the Camp David agreements and was itself surprised by the cost of the agreements, although already during the negotiations it was possible to calculate the heavy price and the serious error involved in not having prepared the economic grounds for peace.
The former Minister of Treasury, Mr. Yigal Holwitz, stated that if it were not for the withdrawal from the oil fields, Israel would have a positive balance of payments (9/17/80). That same person said two years earlier that the government of Israel (from which he withdrew) had placed a noose around his neck. He was referring to the Camp David agreements (Ha’aretz, 11/3/78). In the course of the whole peace negotiations neither an expert nor an economics advisor was consulted, and the Prime Minister himself, who lacks knowledge and expertise in economics, in a mistaken initiative, asked the U.S. to give us a loan rather than a grant, due to his wish to maintain our respect and the respect of the U.S. towards us. See Ha’aretz1/5/79. Jerusalem Post, 9/7/79. Prof Asaf Razin, formerly a senior consultant in the Treasury, strongly criticized the conduct of the negotiations; Ha’aretz, 5/5/79. Ma’ariv, 9/7/79. As to matters concerning the oil fields and Israel’s energy crisis, see the interview with Mr. Eitan Eisenberg, a government advisor on these matters, Ma’arive Weekly, 12/12/78. The Energy Minister, who personally signed the Camp David agreements and the evacuation of Sdeh Alma, has since emphasized the seriousness of our condition from the point of view of oil supplies more than once…see Yediot Ahronot, 7/20/79. Energy Minister Modai even admitted that the government did not consult him at all on the subject of oil during the Camp David and Blair House negotiations. Ha’aretz, 8/22/79.
10. Many sources report on the growth of the armaments budget in Egypt and on intentions to give the army preference in a peace epoch budget over domestic needs for which a peace was allegedly obtained. See former Prime Minister Mamduh Salam in an interview 12/18/77, Treasury Minister Abd El Sayeh in an interview 7/25/78, and the paper Al Akhbar, 12/2/78 which clearly stressed that the military budget will receive first priority, despite the peace. This is what former Prime Minister Mustafa Khalil has stated in his cabinet’s programmatic document which was presented to Parliament, 11/25/78. See English translation, ICA, FBIS, Nov. 27. 1978, pp. D 1-10.
6. Al-Thawra, Syria 12/20/79, Al-Ahram,12/30/79, Al Ba’ath, Syria, 5/6/79. 55% of the Arabs are 20 years old and younger, 70% of the Arabs live in Africa, 55% of the Arabs under 15 are unemployed, 33% live in urban areas, Oded Yinon, “Egypt’s Population Problem,” The Jerusalem Quarterly, No. 15, Spring 1980.
7. E. Kanovsky, “Arab Haves and Have Nots,” The Jerusalem Quarterly, No.1, Fall 1976, Al Ba’ath, Syria, 5/6/79.
8. In his book, former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin said that the Israeli government is in fact responsible for the design of American policy in the Middle East, after June ’67, because of its own indecisiveness as to the future of the territories and the inconsistency in its positions since it established the background for Resolution 242 and certainly twelve years later for the Camp David agreements and the peace treaty with Egypt. According to Rabin, on June 19, 1967, President Johnson sent a letter to Prime Minister Eshkol in which he did not mention anything about withdrawal from the new territories but exactly on the same day the government resolved to return territories in exchange for peace. After the Arab resolutions in Khartoum (9/1/67) the government altered its position but contrary to its decision of June 19, did not notify the U.S. of the alteration and the U.S. continued to support 242 in the Security Council on the basis of its earlier understanding that Israel is prepared to return territories. At that point it was already too late to change the U.S. position and Israel’s policy. From here the way was opened to peace agreements on the basis of 242 as was later agreed upon in Camp David. See Yitzhak Rabin. Pinkas Sherut, (Ma’ariv 1979) pp. 226-227.
9. Foreign and Defense Committee Chairman Prof. Moshe Arens argued in an interview (Ma ‘ariv,10/3/80) that the Israeli government failed to prepare an economic plan before the Camp David agreements and was itself surprised by the cost of the agreements, although already during the negotiations it was possible to calculate the heavy price and the serious error involved in not having prepared the economic grounds for peace.
The former Minister of Treasury, Mr. Yigal Holwitz, stated that if it were not for the withdrawal from the oil fields, Israel would have a positive balance of payments (9/17/80). That same person said two years earlier that the government of Israel (from which he withdrew) had placed a noose around his neck. He was referring to the Camp David agreements (Ha’aretz, 11/3/78). In the course of the whole peace negotiations neither an expert nor an economics advisor was consulted, and the Prime Minister himself, who lacks knowledge and expertise in economics, in a mistaken initiative, asked the U.S. to give us a loan rather than a grant, due to his wish to maintain our respect and the respect of the U.S. towards us. See Ha’aretz1/5/79. Jerusalem Post, 9/7/79. Prof Asaf Razin, formerly a senior consultant in the Treasury, strongly criticized the conduct of the negotiations; Ha’aretz, 5/5/79. Ma’ariv, 9/7/79. As to matters concerning the oil fields and Israel’s energy crisis, see the interview with Mr. Eitan Eisenberg, a government advisor on these matters, Ma’arive Weekly, 12/12/78. The Energy Minister, who personally signed the Camp David agreements and the evacuation of Sdeh Alma, has since emphasized the seriousness of our condition from the point of view of oil supplies more than once…see Yediot Ahronot, 7/20/79. Energy Minister Modai even admitted that the government did not consult him at all on the subject of oil during the Camp David and Blair House negotiations. Ha’aretz, 8/22/79.
10. Many sources report on the growth of the armaments budget in Egypt and on intentions to give the army preference in a peace epoch budget over domestic needs for which a peace was allegedly obtained. See former Prime Minister Mamduh Salam in an interview 12/18/77, Treasury Minister Abd El Sayeh in an interview 7/25/78, and the paper Al Akhbar, 12/2/78 which clearly stressed that the military budget will receive first priority, despite the peace. This is what former Prime Minister Mustafa Khalil has stated in his cabinet’s programmatic document which was presented to Parliament, 11/25/78. See English translation, ICA, FBIS, Nov. 27. 1978, pp. D 1-10.
According to these sources, Egypt’s
military budget increased by 10% between fiscal 1977 and 1978, and the
process still goes on. A Saudi source divulged that the Egyptians plan
to increase their militmy budget by 100% in the next two years; Ha’aretz, 2/12/79 and Jerusalem Post, 1/14/79.
11. Most of the economic estimates threw doubt on Egypt’s ability to reconstruct its economy by 1982. See Economic Intelligence Unit, 1978 Supplement, “The Arab Republic of Egypt”; E. Kanovsky, “Recent Economic Developments in the Middle East,” Occasional Papers, The Shiloah Institution, June 1977; Kanovsky, “The Egyptian Economy Since the Mid-Sixties, The Micro Sectors,” Occasional Papers, June 1978; Robert McNamara, President of World Bank, as reported in Times, London, 1/24/78.
12. See the comparison made by the researeh of the Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and research camed out in the Center for Strategic Studies of Tel Aviv University, as well as the research by the British scientist, Denis Champlin, Military Review, Nov. 1979, ISS: The Military Balance 1979-1980, CSS; Security Arrangements in Sinai…by Brig. Gen. (Res.) A Shalev, No. 3.0 CSS; The Military Balance and the Military Options after the Peace Treaty with Egypt, by Brig. Gen. (Res.) Y. Raviv, No.4, Dec. 1978, as well as many press reports including El Hawadeth, London, 3/7/80; El Watan El Arabi, Paris, 12/14/79.
13. As for religious ferment in Egypt and the relations between Copts and Moslems see the series of articles published in the Kuwaiti paper, El Qabas, 9/15/80. The English author Irene Beeson reports on the rift between Moslems and Copts, see: Irene Beeson, Guardian, London, 6/24/80, and Desmond Stewart, Middle East Internmational, London 6/6/80. For other reports see Pamela Ann Smith, Guardian, London, 12/24/79; The Christian Science Monitor 12/27/79 as well as Al Dustour, London, 10/15/79; El Kefah El Arabi, 10/15/79.
14. Arab Press Service, Beirut, 8/6-13/80. The New Republic, 8/16/80, Der Spiegel as cited by Ha’aretz, 3/21/80, and 4/30-5/5/80; The Economist, 3/22/80; Robert Fisk, Times, London, 3/26/80; Ellsworth Jones, Sunday Times, 3/30/80.
15. J.P. Peroncell Hugoz, Le Monde, Paris 4/28/80; Dr. Abbas Kelidar, Middle East Review, Summer 1979;
Conflict Studies, ISS, July 1975; Andreas Kolschitter, Der Zeit, (Ha’aretz, 9/21/79) Economist Foreign Report, 10/10/79, Afro-Asian Affairs, London, July 1979.
16. Arnold Hottinger, “The Rich Arab States in Trouble,” The New York Review of Books, 5/15/80; Arab Press Service, Beirut, 6/25-7/2/80; U.S. News and World Report, 11/5/79 as well as El Ahram, 11/9/79; El Nahar El Arabi Wal Duwali, Paris 9/7/79; El Hawadeth, 11/9/79; David Hakham, Monthly Review, IDF, Jan.-Feb. 79.
17. As for Jordan’s policies and problems see El Nahar El Arabi Wal Duwali, 4/30/79, 7/2/79; Prof. Elie Kedouri, Ma’ariv 6/8/79; Prof. Tanter, Davar 7/12/79; A. Safdi, Jerusalem Post, 5/31/79; El Watan El Arabi 11/28/79; El Qabas, 11/19/79. As for PLO positions see: The resolutions of the Fatah Fourth Congress, Damascus, August 1980. The Shefa’amr program of the Israeli Arabs was published in Ha’aretz, 9/24/80, and by Arab Press Report 6/18/80. For facts and figures on immigration of Arabs to Jordan, see Amos Ben Vered, Ha’aretz, 2/16/77; Yossef Zuriel, Ma’ariv 1/12/80. As to the PLO’s position towards Israel see Shlomo Gazit, Monthly Review; July 1980; Hani El Hasan in an interview, Al Rai Al’Am, Kuwait 4/15/80; Avi Plaskov, “The Palestinian Problem,” Survival, ISS, London Jan. Feb. 78; David Gutrnann, “The Palestinian Myth,” Commentary, Oct. 75; Bernard Lewis, “The Palestinians and the PLO,” Commentary Jan. 75; Monday Morning, Beirut, 8/18-21/80; Journal of Palestine Studies, Winter 1980.
11. Most of the economic estimates threw doubt on Egypt’s ability to reconstruct its economy by 1982. See Economic Intelligence Unit, 1978 Supplement, “The Arab Republic of Egypt”; E. Kanovsky, “Recent Economic Developments in the Middle East,” Occasional Papers, The Shiloah Institution, June 1977; Kanovsky, “The Egyptian Economy Since the Mid-Sixties, The Micro Sectors,” Occasional Papers, June 1978; Robert McNamara, President of World Bank, as reported in Times, London, 1/24/78.
12. See the comparison made by the researeh of the Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and research camed out in the Center for Strategic Studies of Tel Aviv University, as well as the research by the British scientist, Denis Champlin, Military Review, Nov. 1979, ISS: The Military Balance 1979-1980, CSS; Security Arrangements in Sinai…by Brig. Gen. (Res.) A Shalev, No. 3.0 CSS; The Military Balance and the Military Options after the Peace Treaty with Egypt, by Brig. Gen. (Res.) Y. Raviv, No.4, Dec. 1978, as well as many press reports including El Hawadeth, London, 3/7/80; El Watan El Arabi, Paris, 12/14/79.
13. As for religious ferment in Egypt and the relations between Copts and Moslems see the series of articles published in the Kuwaiti paper, El Qabas, 9/15/80. The English author Irene Beeson reports on the rift between Moslems and Copts, see: Irene Beeson, Guardian, London, 6/24/80, and Desmond Stewart, Middle East Internmational, London 6/6/80. For other reports see Pamela Ann Smith, Guardian, London, 12/24/79; The Christian Science Monitor 12/27/79 as well as Al Dustour, London, 10/15/79; El Kefah El Arabi, 10/15/79.
14. Arab Press Service, Beirut, 8/6-13/80. The New Republic, 8/16/80, Der Spiegel as cited by Ha’aretz, 3/21/80, and 4/30-5/5/80; The Economist, 3/22/80; Robert Fisk, Times, London, 3/26/80; Ellsworth Jones, Sunday Times, 3/30/80.
15. J.P. Peroncell Hugoz, Le Monde, Paris 4/28/80; Dr. Abbas Kelidar, Middle East Review, Summer 1979;
Conflict Studies, ISS, July 1975; Andreas Kolschitter, Der Zeit, (Ha’aretz, 9/21/79) Economist Foreign Report, 10/10/79, Afro-Asian Affairs, London, July 1979.
16. Arnold Hottinger, “The Rich Arab States in Trouble,” The New York Review of Books, 5/15/80; Arab Press Service, Beirut, 6/25-7/2/80; U.S. News and World Report, 11/5/79 as well as El Ahram, 11/9/79; El Nahar El Arabi Wal Duwali, Paris 9/7/79; El Hawadeth, 11/9/79; David Hakham, Monthly Review, IDF, Jan.-Feb. 79.
17. As for Jordan’s policies and problems see El Nahar El Arabi Wal Duwali, 4/30/79, 7/2/79; Prof. Elie Kedouri, Ma’ariv 6/8/79; Prof. Tanter, Davar 7/12/79; A. Safdi, Jerusalem Post, 5/31/79; El Watan El Arabi 11/28/79; El Qabas, 11/19/79. As for PLO positions see: The resolutions of the Fatah Fourth Congress, Damascus, August 1980. The Shefa’amr program of the Israeli Arabs was published in Ha’aretz, 9/24/80, and by Arab Press Report 6/18/80. For facts and figures on immigration of Arabs to Jordan, see Amos Ben Vered, Ha’aretz, 2/16/77; Yossef Zuriel, Ma’ariv 1/12/80. As to the PLO’s position towards Israel see Shlomo Gazit, Monthly Review; July 1980; Hani El Hasan in an interview, Al Rai Al’Am, Kuwait 4/15/80; Avi Plaskov, “The Palestinian Problem,” Survival, ISS, London Jan. Feb. 78; David Gutrnann, “The Palestinian Myth,” Commentary, Oct. 75; Bernard Lewis, “The Palestinians and the PLO,” Commentary Jan. 75; Monday Morning, Beirut, 8/18-21/80; Journal of Palestine Studies, Winter 1980.
18. Prof. Yuval Neeman, “Samaria–The Basis for Israel’s Security,” Ma’arakhot 272-273, May/June 1980; Ya’akov Hasdai, “Peace, the Way and the Right to Know,” Dvar Hashavua, 2/23/80. Aharon Yariv, “Strategic Depth–An Israeli Perspective,” Ma’arakhot 270-271, October 1979; Yitzhak Rabin, “Israel’s Defense Problems in the Eighties,” Ma’arakhot October 1979.
19. Ezra Zohar, In the Regime’s Pliers (Shikmona, 1974); Motti Heinrich, Do We have a Chance Israel, Truth Versus Legend (Reshafim, 1981).
20. Henry Kissinger, “The Lessons of the Past,” The Washington Review Vol 1, Jan. 1978; Arthur Ross, “OPEC’s Challenge to the West,” The Washington Quarterly, Winter, 1980; Walter Levy, “Oil and the Decline of the West,” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1980; Special Report–”Our Armed Forees-Ready or Not?” U.S. News and World Report 10/10/77; Stanley Hoffman, “Reflections on the Present Danger,” The New York Review of Books 3/6/80; Time 4/3/80; Leopold Lavedez “The illusions of SALT” Commentary Sept. 79; Norman Podhoretz, “The Present Danger,” Commentary March 1980; Robert Tucker, “Oil and American Power Six Years Later,” Commentary Sept. 1979; Norman Podhoretz, “The Abandonment of Israel,” Commentary July 1976; Elie Kedourie, “Misreading the Middle East,” Commentary July 1979.
21. According to figures published by Ya’akov Karoz, Yediot Ahronot, 10/17/80, the sum total of anti-Semitic incidents recorded in the world in 1979 was double the amount recorded in 1978. In Germany, France, and Britain the number of anti-Semitic incidents was many times greater in that year. In the U.S. as well there has been a sharp increase in anti-Semitic incidents which were reported in that article. For the new anti-Semitism, see L. Talmon, “The New Anti-Semitism,” The New Republic, 9/18/1976; Barbara Tuchman, “They poisoned the Wells,” Newsweek 2/3/75.
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19. Ezra Zohar, In the Regime’s Pliers (Shikmona, 1974); Motti Heinrich, Do We have a Chance Israel, Truth Versus Legend (Reshafim, 1981).
20. Henry Kissinger, “The Lessons of the Past,” The Washington Review Vol 1, Jan. 1978; Arthur Ross, “OPEC’s Challenge to the West,” The Washington Quarterly, Winter, 1980; Walter Levy, “Oil and the Decline of the West,” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1980; Special Report–”Our Armed Forees-Ready or Not?” U.S. News and World Report 10/10/77; Stanley Hoffman, “Reflections on the Present Danger,” The New York Review of Books 3/6/80; Time 4/3/80; Leopold Lavedez “The illusions of SALT” Commentary Sept. 79; Norman Podhoretz, “The Present Danger,” Commentary March 1980; Robert Tucker, “Oil and American Power Six Years Later,” Commentary Sept. 1979; Norman Podhoretz, “The Abandonment of Israel,” Commentary July 1976; Elie Kedourie, “Misreading the Middle East,” Commentary July 1979.
21. According to figures published by Ya’akov Karoz, Yediot Ahronot, 10/17/80, the sum total of anti-Semitic incidents recorded in the world in 1979 was double the amount recorded in 1978. In Germany, France, and Britain the number of anti-Semitic incidents was many times greater in that year. In the U.S. as well there has been a sharp increase in anti-Semitic incidents which were reported in that article. For the new anti-Semitism, see L. Talmon, “The New Anti-Semitism,” The New Republic, 9/18/1976; Barbara Tuchman, “They poisoned the Wells,” Newsweek 2/3/75.
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